Bartumeu warns Andorra could lose its customs agreement if voters reject the EU deal, but implementing the association could put it at risk

Former Andorran Prime Minister Jaume Bartumeu has once again raised fears that Andorra could lose its customs agreement with the European Union as part of his defence of the EU association agreement.

During an interview on Tuesday with the programme Avui serà un bon dia, the former head of government warned that if Andorra rejects the new treaty, Brussels could terminate the customs agreement that has been in force since 1990.

However, his warning overlooks a fundamental legal distinction: if Andorra does not approve the EU association agreement, the existing customs agreement remains in force. Rejecting the new treaty would not automatically terminate the current trade arrangement.

The risk Bartumeu has failed to explain lies in the opposite scenario. If Andorra allows the EU association agreement to be implemented and the existing customs framework is replaced by the new treaty, a subsequent rejection of the association could leave the Principality without its previous customs agreement.

This distinction becomes particularly important given the possibility that the association agreement could be provisionally applied before Andorra holds its referendum.

If Andorra rejects the EU association agreement, the customs agreement remains in force

The customs agreement between Andorra and the European Economic Community, signed in 1990, has its own legal framework. It does not automatically expire simply because the Principality decides against entering into the new association agreement.

Voting "no" to the EU association agreement is therefore not equivalent to losing the customs agreement.

The existing treaty can only cease to apply through the relevant legal procedures. Specifically, Article 21 provides that either party may terminate the agreement by giving six months' notice.

This means that if Andorra rejects the association agreement, the current customs arrangement would remain in force unless either Andorra or the European Union formally decided to terminate it.

There is no provision establishing that a negative referendum result would automatically bring the existing trade agreement to an end.

Nevertheless, Bartumeu has placed the possibility of losing the customs agreement at the centre of his political warning, without explaining with equal clarity that its continued validity does not depend on approving the new association treaty.

The real risk: implementing the association agreement before the referendum

The most sensitive legal question arises in the opposite scenario: Andorra allowing the new EU association agreement to be applied before consulting its citizens.

The new treaty is designed to incorporate customs relations into a much broader legal framework, replacing the previous bilateral arrangement once the relevant provisions take effect.

If that replacement takes place before the referendum and Andorran voters subsequently reject the association agreement, the 1990 customs agreement would not necessarily be automatically reinstated.

This is the risk that deserves closer scrutiny.

Andorra could move from an independent, existing customs agreement to a trade framework incorporated into the wider association treaty, without any guarantee that the previous arrangement would automatically return if the new treaty were subsequently rejected.

The possibility of provisional application, which has been discussed at the European level, makes this issue particularly relevant.

It would be necessary to establish precisely which provisions could be provisionally applied, when the 1990 customs agreement would cease to operate and what legal safeguards would protect Andorra's trade relations if the referendum resulted in a victory for the "no" campaign.

The distinction is crucial: rejecting the association before it replaces the customs agreement would preserve the existing arrangement, while rejecting it after that replacement has taken legal effect could create a far more complicated situation.

Bartumeu presents the "no" vote as a threat to Andorra's trade relations

During the interview, the former Prime Minister warned that Brussels could terminate the customs agreement if Andorra rejected the association treaty, arguing that any subsequent renegotiation would leave the Principality in a weaker position.

"Si es renegocia, ja li dic jo que hi deixarem plomes, segurament," Bartumeu stated.

His warning suggests that reopening negotiations would likely force Andorra to make concessions.

However, this argument overlooks the fact that Andorra already has a valid customs agreement and that neither party is legally required to terminate it simply because the Principality rejects the association agreement.

The possibility of the European Union unilaterally terminating the existing agreement is legally real, but it is not an inevitable consequence of a negative referendum result.

By contrast, the implementation of provisions replacing the existing customs framework would directly alter the current legal relationship.

This distinction challenges the suggestion that rejecting the association agreement would, by itself, cause Andorra to lose its customs arrangements with the European Union.

A "no" vote does not automatically cancel the 1990 agreement. Implementing the new treaty, however, could result in its replacement.

A significant omission from a former Prime Minister

Bartumeu's statements carry particular political weight given his institutional experience and long-standing involvement in relations between Andorra and the European Union.

He is not an outsider to European negotiations but a former head of government who has participated for years in debates over the Principality's relationship with Brussels and who actively supports the association agreement.

For that reason, his decision to present the possible loss of the customs agreement as an argument against voting "no", without addressing the risks of implementing the association before consulting voters, raises significant questions.

A complete explanation of the legal situation requires both scenarios to be presented, rather than focusing exclusively on the one that supports a particular political position.

Above all, it requires an answer to a question that Bartumeu has not addressed:

Why should Andorra risk replacing a customs agreement that is already in force before knowing whether its citizens actually support the new treaty?

Bartumeu calls for national unity but excludes parties opposing the EU agreement

Alongside his comments on the customs agreement, Bartumeu has called for a broad national political agreement to address Andorra's structural challenges.

The former Prime Minister believes the country needs a cross-party platform capable of moving beyond traditional political divisions and tackling the housing crisis, declining purchasing power, the weakening position of the Catalan language and social inequalities.

However, he has ruled out participating in a centre-right coalition that includes parties without a clearly favourable position towards the EU association agreement.

Consequently, the same political figure calling for national consensus is making support for the European treaty a condition for potential political alliances.

Bartumeu has also criticised Concòrdia and its leader, Cerni Escalé, accusing them of prioritising electoral tactics over a long-term strategic vision.

"La tàctica ha fet perdre la visió estratègica de futur," he stated, arguing that short-term political calculations have undermined a broader vision for the country's future.

The contradiction is politically significant: while calling for an end to partisan divisions, Bartumeu is conditioning his proposed cross-party cooperation on support for an agreement that remains the subject of considerable political and public debate.

The referendum should not take place after safeguards protecting the existing customs agreement have been lost

Bartumeu has proposed holding the referendum on the EU association agreement between three and six months after the appointment of Andorra's next Prime Minister.

Under his proposed timetable, if the general election takes place in March and the new head of government is appointed in April, Andorrans could vote in September 2027.

However, this timetable raises an essential question if European and Andorran institutions decide to proceed with provisional application of the new treaty before the public consultation.

What guarantees would Andorra have that the 1990 customs agreement could still be relied upon if voters subsequently rejected the association?

The answer depends on the precise legal effects of provisional application and the provisions governing the replacement of previous agreements.

Simply stating that the new treaty is necessary for Andorra's future is not sufficient to resolve these legal questions.

What is clear is that Andorra already has a customs agreement in force today and that rejecting the association agreement would not, in itself, terminate that arrangement.

Preserving the existing customs agreement without replacing it prematurely would therefore maintain a degree of legal continuity that should not be put at risk before citizens have had their say.

Bartumeu warns that voting "no" could lead to the loss of Andorra's customs agreement, yet fails to explain that a more direct legal risk to the existing arrangement could arise when the new association treaty begins replacing it.

That is the question supporters of the EU association agreement should clarify before asking Andorran voters to approve the treaty.